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Aggregation Bias

Abstract
We propose an axiomatic approach to a decision
maker’s information aggregation problem. This axiomatic analysis provides a positive model of the decision maker’s evidence assessment process, wherein submitted credible evidence is aggregated into an overall
assessment that is responsive to the individual assessments provided. We show that the axiomatic approach
produces a two-parameter family of functions and the
parameters of the aggregation function have natural interpretations as the decision maker’s bias against the information provider’s report and the breadth of the interpretation of the decision maker’s perspective. We consider two different applications and provide empirical
evidence that the decision makers use this form of information aggregation in practice.

1.

Introduction

Information aggregation is critical for firms due to
its effect on fundamental operations and marketing decisions. For instance, in many supply chains, suppliers
use demand forecast information provided by their customers together with their own estimates to determine
their production capacity. However, such critical information sharing practices are usually prone to strategic
manipulations like overoptimistic forecasts, which are
pervasive across industries from electronics and semiconductors to medical equipment and commercial aircraft ( [2], [7], [10], [11]). The cost of such inflated forecasts from customers to ensure abundant supply capacity can be significant for the manufacturers: [3] shows
that inflated customer forecasts caused $2.1 billion excess inventory costs in 2001 for the major networking
equipment supplier Cisco.
In response to strategic manipulation incentives or
biased views of the information providers, the decision
makers tend to be skeptical about the quality of shared
information. For instance, in the retailing industry,
category captainship is a common management practice where one of the leading manufacturers provides

URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/60115
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

recommendations regarding the strategic category decisions such as pricing, promotion, shelf management,
and assortment decisions. However, category captainship practices vary in terms of the extent to which the
retailer implements captain’s recommendations: At one
end of the spectrum, some retailers use their category
captains’ recommendations as they are; at the other end,
some retailers filter the recommendations provided by
their captains and verify their appropriateness before implementing the recommendations [13]. As an another
example from the automotive industry, [10] reports that
General Motors “purifies” the demand forecast information received from its dealers before using it to decide on
the component capacity of its assembly lines. Such conflicting incentives and interactions of supply chain firms
prevent effective information sharing and, as a result, the
supply chain suffers from sub-optimal operational decisions (e.g., having too much inventory or missing potential demand).
A decision maker who receives a potentially nonreliable information from an outside firm needs to consider a way to aggregate all the available information
into a final assessment. The way of achieving final assessment, or simply assessment process, typically involves behavioral components. For instance, in many
forecast information sharing arrangements, trust and
trustworthiness play a key role because it is impossible to envision all contingencies and write a complete
set of contracts to eliminate all possible vulnerabilities
business partners face or to account for all uncertainties
throughout the relationship [12]. To illustrate, consider
a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer (he) and a
retailer (she). The manufacturer may rely on the downstream retailer’s demand forecast to secure capacity before receiving binding purchase orders from the retailer.
The retailer possesses better forecast information than
the manufacturer because of her proximity to the market.
However, the retailer often has an incentive to inflate her
forecast information to ensure abundant supply. In such
a setup, the manufacturer’s final assessment about the
consumer demand depends on the level of trust the manufacturer puts into the retailer’s forecast. The manufac-
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turer may choose to trust or ignore the retailer’s forecast
completely, or adjust her own judgement with the newly
available forecast information. Thus, the manufacturer’s
final assessment decision on the market demand needs to
internalize his trust behavior.
From a theoretical perspective, to mimic the behavioral aspects of information aggregation, it is common to model an uncertainty facing decision maker as
a Bayesian agent; that is, the decision maker uses the
information provided by its business partner to estimate
the true state of the world in a very specific way. However, inasmuch as the information providers’ information can be regarded as the outcome of strategic search
processes in which the decision maker observes only
the evidence actually presented, there is a huge amount
of “missing data,” which would tend to make Bayesian
inference highly prior-dependent. For instance, there
may be relevant evidence that is available but not presented due to the information provider’s manipulation
incentives (e.g., inflated forecasts from retailers to ensure abundant supply capacity). Relevant evidence may
also be ruled inadmissible with respect to the decision
maker’s evidentiary standard (e.g., information purification by General Motors). Another aspect of missing
data is the extent of the information provider’s “effort”
(e.g., how much time/energy/money the business partner
spent on the search for evidence). Finally, the underlying true state or the world, which presumably affects
the information provider’s ability to find (and the cost
of) exculpatory evidence, is unobservable to the decision maker. To use a Bayesian model of decision maker,
one must substitute a subjective prior distribution for all
of this “missing data.” In addition to theoretical considerations above, laboratory studies such as [6], [9],
and [11] show that participants do not use Bayes’ rule to
update their beliefs and the decision maker’s bias on the
reported information affects the aggregation outcome.
Therefore, we conjecture that a decision maker who receives information from different sources follows a significantly simpler rule than Bayes’ rule to generate a final assessment about decision uncertainty.
In this paper, we propose an axiomatic approach to
the decision maker’s information aggregation problem.
The purpose of this axiomatic analysis is twofold. First,
it provides a positive model of the decision maker’s evidence assessment process, wherein submitted credible
evidence is aggregated into an overall assessment that
is responsive to the individual assessments provided.
Second, the analysis produces a two-parameter family of functions that aggregates the submitted evidence
into the decision maker’s assessment. These parameters
have natural interpretations as the decision maker’s bias
against the information provider’s report and the breadth

of the interpretation of the decision maker’s perspective.
Thus, we provide a non-Bayesian information aggregation methodology that is consistent with the natural restrictions of information aggregation.
To understand the impact of information aggregation process on firm decisions, we apply our aggregation methodology to two different settings. In the first
setting, we consider a forecast sharing model in which a
manufacturer may rely on the downstream retailer’s demand forecast to secure capacity before receiving binding purchase orders from the retailer. Specifically, we
characterize how the manufacturer’s aggregation process affects his belief update about the private forecast
information given the retailer’s report. This characterization provides effective prescriptions for forecast management and contracting strategies for actual business
environments where behavioral components of decision
making matters. In the second setting, we empirically
examine how prior product reviews affect the purchasing decisions of consumers. We focus on identifying
whether consumers show any aggregation bias when
they update their information about a product’s quality.

2.

Assessment Generation

In this section, we provide a model of decision
maker’s information aggregation process, wherein credible evidence from different sources is aggregated into
an overall assessment. Let ξi and ξ j denote the individual assessmentsh proffered
by two information sources
i
where ξi , ξ j ∈ ξ, ξ are bounded below and above by
parameters ξ and ξ, respectively. For example, in the
forecast sharing game analyzed in Section 3.1, the information sources are the retailer’s report and the manufacturer’s prior information about the demand
h i state.
h iLet Ξ
be the assessment space, that is, Ξ = ξ, ξ × ξ, ξ . Any
point in Ξ represents the pair of assessments summarizing the two cases provided by the information provider i
and j. The decision maker’s assessment process his repi
resented by the function A(ξi , ξ j ) where A : Ξ → ξ, ξ .
In what follows we assume that A is continuous for all
(ξi , ξm ) ∈ Ξ, and that the indicated properties are to hold
for all (ξi , ξ j ) ∈ Ξ.

2.1

Axioms for Aggregation

We assume that the assessment function A should
embody two characteristics: (1) be responsive to the information provided and (2) reflects a notion of fairness,
meaning that credible information provided by the parties should be used in an unbiased manner.
The first characteristic (responsiveness) is fairly
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straightforward to implement, which we do via the properties of interiority (I) and strict monotonicity (SM).
(I):

max{ξi , ξ j } ≥ A(ξi , ξ j ) ≥ min{ξi , ξ j }

(SM): ξ∗i > ξi , ξ∗j > ξ j

⇒

A(ξ∗i , ξ j ) > A(ξi , ξ j )

and A(ξi , ξ∗j ) > A(ξi , ξ j )

Interiority argues that the decision maker’s assessment
should lie within the range of assessments provided by
the information providers. To illustrate, suppose that ξi
is greater than ξ j . In this case, the decision maker may
believe that the information provider i’s incentives are
biased upwards and the final assessment should be less
that the i’ report. However, in this case, the decision
maker has no reason to think that the true value of ξ
should be less than ξ j . Note that an implication of interiority is the property of reflexivity: A(ξ, ξ) = ξ, that
is, if the i and j submits information indicating the same
outcome, then the decision maker’s assessment would
be that same level. The second property, strict monotonicity, points out that A is strictly increasing in both ξi
and ξ j . That is, if any new credible information, which
may be presented by the either information providers,
indicates a higher ξ, then the decision maker’s assessment should response to the new evidence by increasing
the final assessment as well, albeit not necessarily at the
same rate. Thus, strong monotonicity implies that the
decision maker does not completely ignore any information provided by the sources. This condition can be
interpreted as some form of decision maker’s trust on the
information providers reports.
The second main characteristic (fairness) requires
that the information provided by i and j be treated in
an unbiased manner. We implement this via two further
axioms, unbiasedness (U) and independence of presentation (IP).
(U):

A(λξi , λξ j ) = λA(ξi , ξ j ) ∀λ, 0 < λ ≤ 1

(IP): ∀ξi1 , ξ j1 , ξi2 , ξ j2 , A (A(ξi1 , ξ j1 ), A(ξi2 , ξ j2 )) =
A (A(ξi1 , ξi2 ), A(ξ j1 , ξ j2 ))
The unbiasedness property is a relative statement requiring that proportional scaling alone of the information
should not influence the outcome disproportionately toward one party or the other. Thus, for example, if i and
j both cut their estimates in half, the decision maker’s
assessment should fall, but there is no obvious reason
why it should fall disproportionately for i or j. The
seemingly natural fairness assumption is that the overall assessment should be reduced to half of the original
assessment.
Finally, independence of presentation eliminates the
impact of extraneous factors such as the nature, style,
or sequence of presentation of the cases on the decision

maker’s assessment. To see this, consider the analogy
that i’s information is partitioned (arbitrarily) into two
subsets. The information from the first subset yields the
assessment ξi1 while the information from the remaining subset yields the assessment ξi2 . Note that this does
not presume ξi = ξi1 + ξi2 , nor does it presume ξi > ξi1
or ξi > ξi2 . Similarly, let the subset assessments for j
be denoted by ξ j1 and ξ j2 . The independence of presentation property asserts that the decision maker’s assessment process should come to the same conclusion by
comparison of the subsets, followed by comparisons of
the assessments based on the subsets, independently of
how the subsets are compared. In particular, note that on
the left, ξi1 is compared with ξ j1 and ξi2 with ξ j2 , while
on the right, ξi1 and ξi2 have been switched. Essentially,
this axiom removes any role of procedural biases (such
as how a case is presented, style of presentation, existence of technical errors) from the decision maker’s assessment. We are now ready to characterize the decision
maker’s assessment generation function.
Theorem 1. The family of functions, indexed by the parameters α and β, given by



β
β 1/β
β 6= 0, α ∈ [0, 1];
αξi + (1 − α)ξ j
A(ξi , ξ j ; α, β) =
1−α

ξα ξ
β = 0, α ∈ [0, 1].
i

j

is the unique family of continuous functions satisfying
interiority, strict monotonicity, unbiasedness, and independence of presentation.
Theorem 1 shows that any model of aggregation represented by A(ξi , ξ j ; α, β) that satisfies the axioms above
must be a “quasi-arithmetic weighted mean.” Thus, the
decision maker’s final assessment is a weighted average of information providers’ reports where the weights
are determined by the parameters α and β. A particular value of α determines the importance of i’s information from the decision maker’s perspective. A particular
value of β determines the way the decision maker averages the reports. That is, β determines what type of averaging methodology the decision maker uses. In particular, β = 1 corresponds to the weighted arithmetic mean
of ξi and ξ j with weights α and (1 − α), respectively.
When β = 0, the decision maker uses the weighted geometric mean and when β = −1, the final assessment is
the weighted harmonic mean. Finally, β → −∞ yields
the minimum of ξi and ξ j and β → ∞ yields the maximum of ξi and ξ j .
Note that we do not restrict an information provider’s
report to be a single deterministic point. For instance, an
information provider’s report can be modeled as a random variable that is supported on some range of potential ξ values. We also allow any type of correlation or
causation between the reports. For example, we do not
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els with Bayesian decision maker). However, Proposition 2 demonstrates that when β > 1 (respectively,
β < 1), these models under-estimate (respectively, overestimate) the final assessment provided by our axiomatic
approach.
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Figure 1: Change of A(ξi , ξ j ; α, β) in ξi when ξ j = 1/2,
α = 1/2, and β ∈ {−10, 1, 10}.
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assume that an information provider’s report is independent from the other information provider’s report; i.e.,
we allow for the cases where ξi is a function of ξ j and
vice versa.
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Properties of Aggregation Function

Next, we characterize how the manufacturer’s final
assessment function reacts to the retailer’s report as well
as to the model parameters.
Proposition 2.
(i) A(ξi , ξ j ; α, β) is a convex (concave) increasing
function of ξi when β ≥ 1 (β ≤ 1).
(ii) A(ξi , ξ j ; α, β) is increasing in β for all α ∈ (0, 1)
and ξi 6= ξ j .
(iii) A(ξi , ξ j ; α, β) is increasing (decreasing) in α for all
β ∈ (−∞, ∞) and ξr ≥ ξm ( ξr < ξm ). Moreover,
A(ξi , ξ j ; α, β) is convex (concave) in α when β ≥ 1
(β ≤ 1).
The first part of Proposition 2 shows that the decision
maker’s final assessment is an increasing function of the
information providers’ reports. However, the increase
in the final assessment is not always linear. Depending
on the value of β, the decision maker’s assessment may
be a convex or concave function of the reports. Figure
1 demonstrates the impact of information provider i’s
report on the decision maker’s final assessment for different values of α and β. The solid line in Figure 1 represents the case where β = 1 so that the decision maker’s
final assessment is linear in ξi . Most information sharing models in the literature uses a setup where the final
assessment is a linear function of the informed agent’s
report and the decision maker’s own prior (e.g., mod-
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(b) ξr = 3/4, ξm = 1/2, and α ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}

Figure 2: Change of A(ξi , ξ j ; α, β) in α and β.
The second part of Proposition 2 demonstrates how
the decision maker’s final assessment reacts to the
changes in β. Intuitively, β has a natural interpretation as the breadth of the decision maker’s interpretation on the reported information. A narrow interpretation means that, for any given pair (ξi , ξ j ), the decision
maker’s assessment will be lower than under a broad interpretation. Since A(ξi , ξ j ; α, β) is increasing in β by
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Proposition 2(ii), low values of β can be interpreted as
reflecting a narrow interpretation, while higher values
of β reflect progressively broader interpretations. Figure
2(b) demonstrates how a change in the decision maker’s
interpretation impacts the final assessment for different
levels of α.
A natural interpretation of α is that it represents the
decision maker’s relative confidence in the information
providers’ reports. In particular, if α = 1, the decision maker considers that i’ report is completely reliable,
whereas if α = 0, the decision maker considers that i’s
report is completely unreliable. Proposition 2(iii) shows
that the real effect of α depends on the decision maker’s
interpretation; i.e., the precise value of β. Figure 2(a)
demonstrates how a change in the decision maker’s confidence on the i’s report impacts the final assessment
for different levels of interpretation. When the decision
maker’s interpretation is broad enough (i.e., β > 1), the
final assessment is more reactive to the high values of
α. On the other hand, when the decision maker’s interpretation is relatively narrow (i.e., β < 1), the final
assessment is more reactive to the low values of α. Only
when β = 1, the final assessment is a linear function of
α and the decision maker’s interpretation does not play
any role in the final assessment.

3.

Applications

In this section, we aim to understand the impact of
aggregation function derived in the previous section on
two different settings in which aggregating different set
of informations is required.

3.1

The Forecast Sharing Model

Consider a newsvendor model where a retailer (she)
and a manufacturer (he) who interact under a wholesale price contract. The manufacturer builds capacity before demand is realized. We consider a demand
model similar to [11]. In particular, demand is given by
D = µ + ξ + ε, where µ is a positive constant denoting
the average market demand and ε is the market uncertainty. Both parties know µ, and they also know that
ε is a zero-mean random variable with cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F(·) and probability density
function (p.d.f.) f (·) supported on [ε, ε]. The parameter
ξ represents the retailer’s private forecast information.
The retailer may have obtained this information because
of her proximity to the market. The manufacturer’s belief about ξ is denoted by ξm , which is common knowledge.
The sequence of events is as follows: (i) the retailer
observes the private forecast ξ and reports her forecast

information as ξr ; (ii) by using all available information
(ξr and ξm ), the manufacturer generates a final assessment about ξ and builds capacity K at unit cost cK > 0;
(iii) demand D is realized and the retailer places an order; (iv) the manufacturer produces min{D, K} at unit
cost c > 0 and charges w per unit delivered; (v) the retailer receives the order and sells at a fixed unit price
r > 0. To ensure production is profitable, we assume
r > c + cK and w ∈ [c + cK , r]. Under this model structure, the expected profits of the retailer and manufacturer
for a given K and ξ are
Πr (K, ξ) = (r − w)Eε [min{µ + ξ + ε, K}]
Πm (K, ξ) = (w − c)Eε [min{µ + ξ + ε, K}] − cK K
If the manufacturer knew ξ (i.e., ξm = ξ with probability one), then he would maximize his expected profit by
setting capacity as


−1 w − c − cK
.
K(ξ) = µ + ξ + F
w−c
However, the manufacturer does not know ξ and the retailer has an incentive to distort (and possibly inflate)
her report of ξ. Since the retailer’s profit Πr (K, ξ) is
increasing in the manufacturer’s capacity choice K, it
is in the best interest of the retailer to induce the manufacturer to build a large capacity to ensure abundant
supply. Anticipating the retailer’s incentive, the manufacturer would not find the reported forecast credible
regardless of whether the retailer tells the truth.
We analyze this forecast sharing game under the assumption that the manufacturer uses A(ξr , ξm ; α, β) to
generate his assessment on the market uncertainty. In
this setup, there are two decisions in sequence: the retailer’s report and the manufacturer’s choice of capacity.
In the first stage, the retailer observes the private forecast ξ and reports her forecast information as ξr . In the
second stage, the manufacturer updates his beliefs according his assessment process A(ξr , ξm ; α, β) and builds
capacity K. We analyze this forecast sharing game using backward induction and characterize first the manufacturer’s optimal capacity decision followed by the retailer’s optimal report strategy.
3.1.1. Analysis with Independent Reports. Suppose
that the manufacturer’s own judgement ξm is a point estimate; i.e., ξm ∈ [ξ, ξ]. Given ξr and ξm , the manufacturer
decides on the capacity level to maximize his expected
profit by solving
max(w − c)Eε [min{µ + A(ξr , ξm ; α, β) + ε, K}] − cK K
K

In this setup, the manufacturer’s optimal capacity decision balances the marginal cost of adding extra capacity
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with the marginal expected benefit of increasing sales
under the manufacturer’s belief structure on the retailer’s
report.
Proposition 3.
(i) The manufacturer’s unique optimal capacity is


∗
−1 w − c − cK
.
K = µ + A(ξr , ξm ; α, β) + F
w−c
(ii) K ∗ is increasing in ξr and decreasing in cK .
(iii) K ∗ is increasing in β for all ξr 6= ξm and increasing
(decreasing) in α for all ξr ≥ ξm ( ξr < ξm ).
The first part of Proposition 3 provides the manufacturer’s optimal capacity decision. The second part of
Proposition 3 shows that the optimal capacity decision
is positively correlated with the retailer”s report and reducing capacity cost yields higher capacity. These results are consistent with the experimental evidence provided by [11]. The last part of Proposition 3 demonstrates the impact of the manufacturer’s belief structure
on his capacity choice. In particular, if the manufacturer’s interpretation of provided evidences about ξ becomes broader, then his optimal capacity increases. On
the other hand, if his confidence on the retailer’s report
increases, then his optimal capacity decision moves towards to the outcome that the retailer’s report suggests.
In the first stage, anticipating the manufacturer’s optimal capacity strategy, the retailer maximizes her own
profit by choosing a report ξr . As in [11], we assume
that there is a cost of providing ξr for the retailer to capture the retailer’s trustworthiness by the disutility of deception. This disutility of deception can be viewed as
a psychological cost derived from the retailer’s aversion
to being caught in deceit. In particular, we assume that
the cost of generating report ξr is κ|ξr − ξ| when the true
demand state is characterized by ξ. The parameter κ > 0
controls the retailer’s incentive to misreport her private
forecast. Notice that a retailer with a higher κ is more
trustworthy because she incurs a higher disutility when
giving the same amount of information distortion as a
retailer with a lower κ. Then, the retailer solves
max(r − w)Eε [min{µ + ξ + ε, K ∗ }] − κ|ξr − ξ|.
ξr

Proposition 4.
(i) The retailer’s optimal reporting strategy, ξ∗r , is such
that
A(ξ∗r , ξm ; α, β) = ξ + (z∗r − zm )


0 −κ
where
z∗r = F −1 (r−w)A
,
zm =
0
(r−w)A

∗ ,ξ ;α,β)
∂A(ξ
r m
K
F −1 w−c−c
, and A0 =
|ξr =ξ∗r =
w−c
∂ξr
1−β

 β  β
α α + (1 − α) ξξm∗
.
r

(ii) ξ∗r is increasing in β and it is increasing (decreasing) in α for all ξr ≥ ξm ( ξr < ξm ).
Part (i) of Proposition 4 reveals that the retailer’s optimal reporting strategy is such that it makes the manufacturer’s final assessment equal to the true demand state
plus some adjustment factor. The parameter z∗r denotes
the retailer’s adjustment factor, which is a function of the
retailer’s reporting strategy, and zm denotes the manufacturer’s adjustment factor, which is independent from the
retailer’s report. Then, the adjustment that the retailer
makes to the true demand state is z∗r − zm . The manufacturer learns the true demand state with his assessment process (i.e., A(ξ∗r , ξm ; α, β) = ξ) when z∗r = zm . If
z∗r > zm , the manufacturer’s assessment over-estimates
the demand, whereas if z∗r < zm , the final assessment
under-estimates the demand.
Part (ii) of Proposition 4 shows the impact of a
change in the manufacturer’s assessment process on the
retailer’s reporting strategy. In particular, the retailer inflates her report more when facing with a manufacturer
whose breadth of interpretation is broader. On the other
hand, if the manufacturer’s confidence on the retailer increases, then it is more likely that the manufacturer’s
final assessment is going to be closer to the retailer’s report.
3.1.2. Analysis with Dependent Reports. Our model
in Section 3.1 assumes that the manufacturer’s own
judgement is a point estimate that is independent from
the retailer’s report. Now, we relax this assumption by
considering a setup where the manufacturer’s judgement
is a function of the retailer’s report; i.e., ξm = h(ξr )
where h is continuous function that maps each retailer’s
report to a belief structure. We do not put any structure on the shape of manufacturer’s judgement. For instance, the manufacturer’s judgement can be a point estimate that depends on the retailer’ report (e.g., h(ξr ) =
E[ξ | ξr ]) or it can be a random variable where the domain of the random variable is a function of the retailer’ report. The “trust-embedded” model of Ozer et
al. (2011) is an example for the latter case. In their
setup, the manufacturer updates his belief on ξ via the
rule αξr + (1 − α)h(ξr ) where h(ξr ) follows the distribution of ξ truncated on [ξ, ξr ].
In this section, we assume that β = 1 and the retailer
knows the structure of h(·) for simplicity. Then, given ξr
and h(·), the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s expected
payoffs are
Π̂m

= (w − c)Eε [min{µ + A(ξr ) + ε, K}] − cK K

Π̂r

= (r − w)Eε [min{µ + ξ + ε, K}] − κ|ξr − ξ|

where A(ξr ) = αξr + (1 − α)h(ξr ). The sequence of
events is the same as that in Section 3.1. In particu-
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lar, there are two decisions in sequence: the retailer’s
report and the manufacturer’s choice of capacity. As before, we analyze the model using backward induction
and characterize first the manufacturer’s optimal capacity decision followed by the retailer’s optimal forecast
report.
Proposition 5. In the equilibrium of the model with report dependent manufacturer judgement, the manufacturer’s unique optimal capacity is


∗
∗
−1 w − c − cK ˆ ∗
ˆ
ˆ
| ξr , α
K̂(ξr , α) = µ + αξr + G
w−c


where G · | ξˆ ∗r , α is the c.d.f. for (1 − α)h(ξˆ ∗r ) + ε
given ξˆ ∗r and α, and the retailer’s optimal reporting
strategy, ξˆ ∗ , is such that

The model strategy is to derive the distribution of the
observed reviews from the basic assumptions of the review process, which allows us to use the maximum likelihood method to estimate the parameters of the model
from empirical data. Using the aggregation rule, the resulting assessment, y, is given by:

1/β
β
y = A(xi , x̄; α, β) = αxi + (1 − α)x̄β
The cumulative distribution of y, using the change of
1/β
 β
x̄β
, is:
variable xi = y −(1−α)
α


zβ − (1 − α)x̄β
Fy (z) = Fx 
α

!1/β 


r

K̂(ξˆ ∗r , α) = ξ + Â(ξˆ ∗r , α) + F −1

(r − w)K̂ 0 (ξˆ ∗r , α) − κ
(r − w)K̂ 0 (ξˆ ∗ , α)

!

r

ˆ

where K̂ 0 (ξˆ ∗r , α) = ∂K̂(ξˆr ,α) |ξˆ r =ξˆ ∗ .
∂ξr
r
Proposition 5 generalizes the results in Section 3.1
for the cases where the manufacturer’s own judgment
is a function of the retailer’s report. The proposition demonstrates that the incentive conflict between the
manufacturer and retailer can be measured by the difference between the adjustment factors of each firm.

3.2

Customer Reviews.

The second application we consider focuses on the
impact of assessment function on the customer reviews,
which are increasingly important to marketing. Research has shown that ( [5], [4], [8]) past reviews have
impacts on future ones. In this section, we adapt the information aggregation rule to the dynamics of reviews,
and analyze empirical review data to determine if the
model is supported.
3.2.1. Dynamical Model with Step-wise Aggregation.
Consider a setting where a particular product receives
a sequence of reviews from unique individuals (i.e., no
individual submits more than one review). We assume
the private assessment of the product xi for individual i
is a real number and distributed i.i.d. with some cumulative distribution Fx . We further assume that an individual is influenced by the past reviews, and his “resulting” assessment is an aggregation between his private
assessment, xi , and some characteristics of the past assessments. For the purpose of this discussion, we will
limit our attention to the mean of past assessments, x̄.
The formulation is general and can be extended to other
characteristics, such as the most recent assessment.

The parameter α decides how much weight an individual will place on his private assessment. If α = 1, the
individual does not use any past assessment and only
rely on his/her own private assessment xi . If α = 1,
the individual has no opinion and uses the assessment
x̄ from the past. The parameter β controls whether the
response to assessments (private or past) to be concave
(β < 1) or convex (β > 1). A concave/convex response
can be interpreted as the individual to be more sensitive
to changes in low/high assessments.
3.2.2. Reporting Bias. Past research ( [1], [4], [8]) has
shown that individuals do not always report their assessments of products as reviews, and that their propensity of doing so is not independent of their assessments.
Specifically, the satisfaction theory ( [1]) argues that an
individual is more likely to report his assessment (i.e.
post a review) if his/her final assessment (y) is further
away from the average (x̄). That is, the motivation to
“chime in” is stronger when the individual is disagreeing with the average opinion.
We operationalize this idea with a probability of reviewing, given by:


2
P(review) = p0 + (1 − p0 ) 1 − e−γ(y−x̄)
Where p0 and γ are parameters of the model. When the
individual agrees with the average assessment, y− x̄ = 0,
and P(review) = p0 . In this case, p0 can be interpreted
as the minimum probability of reviewing. When the individual disagrees with the average assessment strongly,
(y − x̄)2 → ∞, and P(review) = 1. That is, the individual
will review with probability 1.
3.2.3. Review Data. Consumer reviews were collected
from one of the most popular media website on technology and consumer electronics — CNET.com. We
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used a web scrawling software package BeautifulSoup
in Python. Top brands in the computer category were
selected: HP, Dell, Apple, Sony, Acer and Toshiba. For
each brand, we collected the review scores, and the time
of reviews, plus the product characteristics of all the
products. This complete data set contains 18,840 reviews on 1,491 products of the 5 brands over a 7-year
period. The data set is described with the statistics presented in the Table below.
Table 1: Data Description – (P.N.–Product No, R.N.–
Review No., A.R.– Avg. Rating, Stdev. – Stdev. Rating)
Brands
Apple
Dell
HP
Sony
Toshiba
Summary

P.N.
167
193
390
659
82
1491

R.N.
6874
1050
3202
6930
784
18840

A.R.
3.48
2.84
2.87
3.60
3.36
3.23

Stdev.
1.45
1.64
1.61
1.47
1.47
1.51

3.2.4. Estimation and Analysis. For a particular product, we assume the private assessments of individuals
are distributed with a truncated normal, with mean µ and
standard deviation σ, both to be estimated from the data.
We assume a truncated normal, in the range of [0, 5], to
be consistent with the range of the review scores. We
further assume the final assessment y and whether the
individual reviews are conditionally independent. Since
the observed review scores are in the increment of 0.5,
we discretize the model, and the probability of observing a score s is given by:
P(s) = P(review)P(s − 1/2 < y ≤ s + 1/2)
= P(review)(Fy (s + 1/2) − Fy (s − 1/2))
This model has 6 parameters: µ, σ, α, β, p0 and γ.
We estimate the 6 parameters by the standard maximum likelihood method. Let θ = {µ, σ, α, β, p0 , γ}. For
a sequence of review scores {s1 , s2 , ..., sN }, the loglikelihood function is given by:
N

L(θ) = ∑ log(P(si |θ))
i=1

Note that for each term log(P(si |θ), x̄ =

1
i−1

∑i−1
j=1 s j .

3.2.5. Estimation Results and Hypothesis Testing.
We only estimate the model for products with at least
50 review scores to ensure enough statistics. While
the threshold is arbitrary, our main conclusions will not
change if the threshold is increased to 60. The model is

estimated for 72 products. It is not practical to provide
the detailed estimates for all 72 products. Hence, the
main consults will be supported by a summary of the
estimation.
However, to ensure clarity, we first discuss the estimation of a single product: Apple iTunes 7. The following table summarizes the model estimation of this
product.
Table 2: Model Estimation and Hypothesis Testing for
Apple iTunes 7 – (µ–mean of private assessment, σ–s.d.
of private assessment, α–weight on private assessment,
β–nonlinear influence, γ–reporting bias, p0 –min probability to report)
parameter
µ
σ
α
β
γ
p0

estimate
1.9608
2.2927
0.8736
1.0902
0.0002
0.0008

p-value
NA
NA
0.0000
0.0000
NA
0.0017

hypothesis

H0: α = 1
H0: β = 1
H0: p0 = 1

Result 1: The reviews of Apple iTune 7 exhibits nonlinear response from past influence and reporting biases.
We use the likelihood ratio test to determine (i) if
there is any influence from the past average reviews
score (H0: α = 1), (ii) if the influence from the past,
if any, is nonlinear (H0: β = 1) and (iii) if there is any
self-reporting bias (H0: p0 = 1). We find that α is significantly below 1 (0.8736) with a p-value that is practically 0, indicating strong support that there is some influence from past reviews. β is significantly higher than
1, with a p-value also practically 0. This is strong evidence that this influence from the past is nonlinear. In
addition, p0 is significant below 1 with a p-value below
1%, again indicating strong evidence of a reporting bias,
in this case.
All the products are analyzed in this fashion. Clearly,
these behaviors (influence from the past, nonlinear influence, reporting bias) are not significant in all the products. We summarizes the aggregate results for the 72
products in the following table.
Result 2: Most products exhibit influence from past reviews with half of the responses being nonlinear.
The estimated α is significantly less than 1 for 58%
of the products, indicating there is evidence of influence
from past average review score in a majority of the products. Out of these products, roughly half (19 out of 42)
has a significant β. It does worth noting that in all 19
cases, β > 0 consistent with the interpretation that reviewers pay more attention to extreme values.
Result 3: Most products exhibit reporting biases.
The estimated p0 is significantly less than 1 for 63%
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Table 3: Model Estimation and Hypothesis Testing for
72 Products
[5]
parameter

mean

s. d.

µ
σ
α
β
γ
p0

2.948
2.248
0.832
1.147
0.807
0.057

1.277
0.673
0.042
0.204
0.811
0.087

% of products
significant at 5%
N/A
N/A
58%
26%
N/A
63%

[6]

[7]

[8]
of the products, indicating reporting biases are in a majority of the products.

4.

Conclusion

In this paper, we consider an axiomatic model of
information aggregation. We provide a unique twoparameter family of information aggregation functions
for a collection of mild axioms on the assessment generation process. The parameters of the information aggregation function have natural interpretations as certain
types of consistent behavioral biases in the aggregation
process. In order to test the impact of such an aggregation process on the managerial decisions, we consider
two applications from the operations management and
marketing literatures. In both of these applications, information aggregation is at the core of the decision making process. We show how the behavioral biases characterized by the information aggregation function affect
the decision making outcomes in the context of these
two applications. We also provide empirical evidence
that the decision makers use this form of information
aggregation in practice.
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